Mahmoud Saidiy; Mostafa Esfandiari; Mohammad-Moein Esfandiari
Abstract
In his Sidiqin argument, Mullā Ṣadrā proves the existence of God based on the external reality and the idea of the gradation (tashkīk) of existence. Sheikh Aḥmad Aḥsā'ī raises ...
Read More
In his Sidiqin argument, Mullā Ṣadrā proves the existence of God based on the external reality and the idea of the gradation (tashkīk) of existence. Sheikh Aḥmad Aḥsā'ī raises multiple criticisms against this argument. His critiques include objections regarding the division of the reality of existence, the qualification of Ṣadrā’s argument as truly "Sidiqin," and the notion of the gradation of existence in Ṣadrā’s philosophy. This article, using an analytical-critical method, examines and critiques Aḥsā'ī’s objections organized around three main aspects: the division of the reality of existence, the Sidiqin qualification of Ṣadrā’s argument, and the gradation of existence. The findings reveal that Aḥsā'ī’s criticisms stem from confusing the concept of existence with its instances and committing fallacies by mixing the form and matter of the argument. Furthermore, evidences supporting Mullā Ṣadrā’s Sidiqin argument exist in Qur’anic verses and traditions, indicating that, contrary to Aḥsā'ī’s view, the proof of God is not limited solely to arguments based on His signs and works. Additionally, essences (māhiyāt) are conventional and abstract, derived from the limitation of existence in the weaker ontological levels; therefore, contrary to Aḥsā'ī’s claims, essences are not uncreated or eternal, and their existence at the weaker levels does not contradict the proof of God’s existence.
