https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/ Islamic Philosophical Doctrines en daily 1 Sun, 22 Jun 2025 00:00:00 +0330 Sun, 22 Jun 2025 00:00:00 +0330 https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2246.html This research undertakes a critical re-reading of the conceptual metaphor of the “cage” (Qafas) in the tenth verse of Avicenna’s Al-Qaṣīdah al-ʿAyniyyah. Despite the widespread consensus among commentators interpreting the “cage” as the material body, this interpretation proves incompatible with the dual role of the body in Avicenna’s psychology, wherein the body is simultaneously an aid to and an obstacle for the soul. Accordingly, the primary question of this research is: assuming this incompatibility, what does the “cage” metaphorically represent in this verse, and how can this apparent contradiction be resolved? The findings of this research demonstrate that the “cage” does not represent the body itself, but rather serves as a conceptual metaphor for the soul’s preoccupation with the body and the epistemic obstacles arising from this preoccupation. This redefinition, through a systematic analysis of metaphorical mappings and reliance on a network-based reading of Avicenna’s works, resolves the aforementioned incompatibility and enables a more coherent understanding of the body’s place in his thought. Finally, by tracing the origin of this metaphor and comparing it with preceding intellectual traditions, it is concluded that the present reading is not an imitation of Platonic and Neoplatonic traditions, but rather a creative re-appropriation grounded in Avicenna’s independent philosophical system. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2208.html The issue of freedom has been and is one of the broad and living issues of all ages, and the quality of the view of its philosophical truth is, on the one hand, dependent on the philosophical foundations of the philosophers, and on the other hand, it is itself dependent on many other individual-social issues. Mulla Sadra and Heidegger are two very influential philosophers, and based on their philosophical foundations, a specific view of freedom is formed. Sadra's fitrat and Heidegger's conscience are considered the most important components of these two philosophers in drawing freedom. In this article, we have analytically addressed the role of fitrat from Mulla Sadra's perspective in realizing freedom and the role of conscience from Heidegger's perspective in realizing freedom, and we have entered into the commonalities and differences of their views in a comparative manner. By comparative examination of Sadra's fitrat and Heidegger's conscience in the areas of essence, origin, destination, and content, regarding its role in realizing freedom, the following results are obtained: although there are commonalities, Heidegger's view has gaps that can be healed by Sadra's system of wisdom. The result of this research is the superiority of Sadr al-Mutalahin's view in these matters: 1) presenting a correct picture of the origin of nature (based on the theory of existence, connection, and manifestation), 2) explaining the (knowledgeable and tendential) properties of nature, 3) presenting a comprehensive picture of the existential dimensions of man (moral and mystical), 4) corresponding levels of human existence ... https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2174.html The question of cognitive capacity in Artificial Intelligence (AI) constitutes one of the fundamental challenges at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and modern cognitive technology. This article seeks to critique the foundation of knowledge (ʿilm) in AI systems based on the theory of the unity of the knower and the known (Ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa al-Maʿqūl) in Transcendent Theosophy (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah). Employing an analytical-comparative approach and relying on the principles of Islamic philosophy, the present research undertakes a conceptual and critical examination of the nature of knowledge in AI and its comparison with presential knowledge (al-ʿilm al-Ḥuḍūrī) in Ṣadrian philosophy. In the theory of the unity of the knower and the known, knowledge is a mode of existence that entails agency, the immateriality of the soul (Tajarrud al-Nafs), and the presence of the known to the knower, whereas AI merely processes data without awareness or presential perception. This distinction not only reveals that knowledge in AI lacks existential foundation and constitutes mere quasi-perception, but also carries epistemological and ethical implications. According to the presented analysis, machine intelligence systems, due to their lack of presential knowledge, are devoid of characteristics such as intention (Niyyah), purpose (Qaṣd), and moral responsibility. Consequently, jurisprudential concepts such as intent (Qaṣd) and deliberateness (Taʿammud), which are based on conscious agency, are not applicable to AI, and human legal and ethical judgments cannot be attributed to them. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2179.html This research, using an analytical-critical method, examines and evaluates the effectiveness of Fayyaz Lahiji's defenses of the arguments for proving the existence of the researcher Khafri in confronting the criticisms of Sadr al-Mutalahin. The present study focuses on a comparative analysis of Lahiji's interpretations - including his conceptual distinctions in the field of essential priority, time, and the rule of "possible as possible" - with Mulla Sadra's fundamental criticisms. The results show that Lahiji has strengthened the foundation of Khafri's argument by providing a systematic reconstruction. However, according to the studies conducted, his defenses have shortcomings in some cases, especially in the distinction between existence as a existent and existence as an attribute, compared to Mulla Sadra's responses. The conclusion is that Lahiji's contribution is a methodical attempt at fundamental reconstruction, but the key contribution and distinction of this study lies in providing a rigorous and documented critical assessment of the adequacy of these defenses against Sadr al-Muttalahin's final critique, which highlights these limitations in the evolution of the existential argument. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2178.html The problem of Tashkīk (gradation of being) is among the most fundamental issues in Islamic philosophy, playing a decisive role in the formation of Transcendent Theosophy and the transition from the principiality of quiddity (Aṣālat al-Māhiyyah) to the principiality of existence (Aṣālat al-Wujūd). This concept was a focal point of precise reflection and profound philosophical debate in the School of Shiraz, particularly among philosophers such as Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Dashtakī, and ʿAllāmah Mullā ʿAbd Allāh al-Yazdī. Employing a descriptive-analytical approach and based on a study of Mullā ʿAbd Allāh Yazdī’s treatise Al-Tashkīk and his glosses on Qūshjī’s commentary on Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād, the present research examines the evolution of his view from an inclination toward the principiality of quiddity to his final emphasis on the principiality of existence. The research method is comparative textual analysis based on a comparison of the views of al-Dawānī, al-Dashtakī, and al-Yazdī, along with an extraction of al-Yazdī’s final position from his philosophical and logical glosses. The findings indicate that Mullā ʿAbd Allāh was initially aligned with his teacher, Ghiyāth al-Dīn al-Dashtakī, in accepting Tashkīk in quiddities. However, in his final reflections, he explicitly affirmed the principiality of existence and the conventionality (Iʿtibārī) of quiddity, confining the domain of Tashkīk exclusively to the external reality of existence. This shift in perspective laid the groundwork for connecting the intellectual currents of the School of Shiraz to the foundations of Ṣadrian Transcendent Theosophy. Consequently, al-Yazdī’s theory can be regarded as one of the evolutionary links in Islamic philosophy’s transition from conceptual Tashkīk to existential Tashkīk—a link whose role in connecting the ideas of the School of Shiraz with the School of Isfahan and the formation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy is fundamental. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2228.html The Faṣṣ Yūsufī of Ibn ʿArabī is regarded as one of the most distinguished sections of Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, in which luminous wisdom (ḥikma nūriyya) is attributed to the Prophet Joseph (Yūsuf, peace be upon him). In this faṣṣ, Ibn ʿArabī, relying on the ontological foundations of the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) and the theory of divine manifestation (tajallī), interprets the story of Joseph not merely as a historical narrative but as a symbolic representation of the spiritual journey of the human soul—from darkness to light, from form to meaning, and from multiplicity to unity.Within this interpretation, Joseph is presented as the locus of manifestation of the divine Names of beauty and light, such as al-Nūr (the Light), al-Muṣawwir (the Fashioner), al-ʿAlīm (the All-Knowing), al-Jamīl (the Beautiful), al-Ḥakīm (the Wise), and al-Ḥaqq (the Real), since both the knowledge of dream interpretation and intrinsic beauty and luminosity are united in him. Through luminous wisdom, Ibn ʿArabī explicates the relationship between the imaginal realm (ʿālam al-mithāl), imagination (khayāl), and the knowledge of interpretation (taʿbīr), demonstrating that Joseph, as the Perfect Human (al-insān al-kāmil), is a mirror in which the divine Names are manifested at different levels of being.Employing a descriptive–analytical method and drawing upon the text of the Faṣṣ Yūsufī and the commentaries of major figures such as al-Jandī, Qayṣarī, Khwārazmī, Pārsā, and other commentators, this article analyzes the manifestations of the divine Names and the symbolic meaning of the Yūsufī spiritual journey, and on this basis proposes a Yūsufī https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2127.html Hasan al-Baṣrī can be regarded as one of the first pessimistic thinkers in the Islamic world. His pessimism concerns the relationship between human beings and the terrestrial world (Dunyā), and consequently, their eternal felicity or wretchedness. From his perspective, humanity has no destiny but wretchedness, except for a few individuals who, by attending to their true nature, are exempted from this general rule. According to al-Baṣrī, the essence of the world is deceitful, while the human essence is inherently susceptible to being deceived. Accordingly, the world in all its manifestations prevents human beings from attending to the hereafter, and what ensues is their eternal wretchedness and misfortune. This article, written through logical and rational analysis, examines and critiques al-Baṣrī’s view concerning the world and his opinion on human nature. It clarifies that al-Baṣrī’s identification of the “world” with the “terrestrial world” led to a deviation in his understanding of asceticism (Zuhd) and world-renunciation, the consequences of which are evident even in his political and social stances. From a typological perspective, although al-Baṣrī’s pessimism ostensibly pertains to human felicity, in reality, his pessimism ultimately reverts to suspicion toward God and His names and attributes. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2182.html Psychology is one of the most important topics of transcendental wisdom, which is discussed under the topics of the fourth book of the Four Books. One of the most important rules of Sadra'i psychology is the rule "the soul in its unity of all the four powers", which was raised in view of the union of matter and form, the movement of essence, and the physicality of the existence of the rational soul. Although Mulla Sadra considers this rule to be obvious, he also provided arguments to explain and prove it from the perspective of the known and known. He stated that the rational soul perceives the perceptions and information of all powers and is the agent of the movement of all material powers. Gholamreza Fayyazi raised criticisms of this rule and its arguments, the most important of which is the lack of union between the rational soul and the vegetative powers, as well as the necessity of the union of opposites if one believes in this rule. In the present study, it was proven that all these criticisms are due to the lack of attention to the foundations of Sadra and the contents of this rule. Because this rule has two meanings in Sadra'i wisdom; That the rational soul, in its essence, possesses the perfections of all the inferior powers in a way of unity and simplicity, and that the various animal and plant powers are the lower levels of the reality of the rational soul. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2173.html This study adopts an analytical-comparative approach to explore the concept of love in the philosophical systems of Avicenna and Schopenhauer. Avicenna examines love through three distinct lenses: the medical—viewing it as an obsessive disorder akin to melancholia; the philosophical—considering it a principle underlying the preservation of existents; and the mystical—interpreting chaste love as a means of inner purification. Schopenhauer, in turn, articulates love across three domains: sexual love, understood as a deceptive mechanism serving the preservation of the species; the will-to-live, as a force permeating all of existence; and pure love, manifested as compassion and a path to redemption. The findings highlight a parallel in the universality of love and will across all beings, while revealing a fundamental divergence in their metaphysical foundations: Avicenna’s ontology is rooted in the primacy of the good, whereas Schopenhauer’s worldview is grounded in the primacy of suffering. As the first comprehensive comparative study of these two thinkers on the subject of love, this research opens a new horizon for the philosophical understanding of love. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2207.html The aim of the article is to present a new model of religious rationality based in the two intellectual systems of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga. A comprehensive model that can combine the ontological and existential elements of the Islamic tradition with the criteria of contemporary analytical epistemology. By emphasizing the knowledge of presence, the formation of existence, and the unity of the wise and the reasonable, Mulla Sadra presents a structure of religious knowledge that is organized on the basis of the existential and intuitive realization of knowledge. Plantinga presents a functionalist picture of religious rationality by proposing the theory of "guarantee" and explaining the correct functioning of epistemic powers. Thearticle, using an analytical comparative method, attempts to examine a new model of religious rationality through a dialogue between these two philosophical systems. The importance of the subject of this article lies in the fact that it does not limit itself to a conceptual comparison between the two traditions, but rather, with the aim of theorizing, brings together the fundamental elements of both systems to build a combined model of religious rationality. The structure of the article includes three main parts: first, explaining the foundations of religious knowledge in transcendental wisdom; second, analyzing the foundations of religious knowledge based on Plantinga's theory of guarantee; and third, presenting a proposed model for religious rationality based on the combination of the two traditions. The findings of the article show that the combination of "intuitive ontology" with "functionalist analysis can be rationally explained. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2177.html The question of meaning and its relationship with expressive forms has long been a central concern in philosophical and linguistic discourse. Linguists have hitherto examined language and linguistic issues from the perspective of Western philosophy, but this topic has not been addressed from the standpoint of Transcendent Theosophy (al-Ḥikmat al-Mutaʿāliyah). Employing a descriptive-analytical methodology and a study of foundational linguistic and philosophical texts, this research undertakes a comparative analysis of three approaches: the Saussurean, the Derridean, and that of Transcendent Theosophy. The findings indicate that the philosophical approach of Transcendent Theosophy, by explaining the single signified (Madlūl) and its multiple manifestations (Tajalliyāt) in the form of various signifiers (Dāll), offers a more coherent framework for understanding the system of signs—something that cannot be adequately explained by the theories of Saussure and Derrida alone. This theoretical framework, drawing upon the principles of Transcendent Theosophy, presents a novel model in linguistics that accounts for both the continuity of meaning and the diversity of its expressive forms. The main achievement of this research is the formulation of a theory in linguistics based on Transcendent Theosophy, which has the potential for application in linguistic studies and the humanities. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2171.html Sayyid Nur al-Din Araki, known as Aqa Nur al-Din Iraqi, is considered one of the renowned contemporary scholars who, despite his complete mastery in the fields of "Jurisprudence and Principles" and "Quranic Interpretation", is also considered an expert in the field of "rational sciences". In this study, the authors, using a descriptive-analytical method, seek to extract and explain the opinions and theories of this prominent figure in the field of "anthropology" and to briefly apply these theories to the foundations of transcendental wisdom. Among the most important components of Iraqi anthropology, we can mention such things as: "Belief in the sacred is the criterion of human rationality", "Human existence as a microcosm corresponding to the existence of the macrocosm", "Human soul as a mobile and evolving reality", "Elemental body and super-soul, two lower and higher levels of the human soul", "Reaching God is the ultimate goal and perfection of the human soul", "Harmony between human action and existential form", "Faith is the main factor in the strength and perfection of the human soul", and "Removing egoism is the wisdom of establishing religious rituals". A brief comparison of the aforementioned components with the foundations of transcendental wisdom demonstrates the fact that these components can be compared and interpreted with some of the fundamental foundations of transcendental wisdom, such as: “the eternal necessity and infinity of the Almighty”, “the total perfection of the Almighty and His manifestations”, “the essential movement of the soul”, “ https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2190.html The question of human nature constitutes one of the most fundamental topics in anthropology and the humanities. Jean-Paul Sartre, within the framework of atheistic existentialism, denies any fixed essence for the human being and emphasizes human self-creation and absolute free will. The present research aims to provide a rational analysis and critique of Sartre’s view concerning the “denial of human nature” and to explain its consequences based on the principles of Islamic anthropology. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and library-based data collection, this study examines the challenges of this approach in the domains of epistemology, ethics, and ontology. The findings indicate that the denial of human nature conflicts with the foundations of Islamic anthropology, is incompatible with psychological and sociological realities, and faces serious challenges in the fields of epistemology, ethics, anthropology, and ontology. Furthermore, the negation of human nature entails negative consequences such as nihilism, existential anxiety, and moral relativism, leading to the reduction of human perfection and the neglect of the spiritual dimensions of human existence. In contrast, Islamic anthropology, relying on the concept of Fiṭrah (primordial nature), while safeguarding human freedom, provides a teleological framework for explaining innate human tendencies that prevents the crisis of meaning and moral relativism, and offers a foundation for the indigenization of the human sciences. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2218.html Avicenna and Mulla Sadra both present a coherent program of ascetic practice that appears to pursue similar aims; however, beneath these apparent similarities lies a fundamental difference.With an analytical–comparative approach, this paper first examines the five foundational anthropological principles of the two philosophers and then demonstrates how these distinctions affect the definition of the soul’s illness and the prescription for its cure.The findings indicate that in Avicennian philosophy, the soul is a fixed substance that employs the body as a temporary instrument, and the soul’s levels are accidental states of this substance. Thus, illness of the soul is the dominance of bodily faculties over this immutable essence.From Mulla Sadra’s perspective, however, the soul is the product of the substantial motion (al-harakah al-jawhariyyah) of matter and is in a state of continual becoming. The body is the origin of its formation, and the levels of the soul correspond to its degrees of existence. Therefore, illness signifies the soul’s intensification within the lower degrees of being.This fundamental difference leads the threefold aims of asceticism in Transcendent Philosophy (al-Hikmah al-Muta‘āliyah) to acquire an ontological reinterpretation—transforming asceticism from a merely purificatory discipline into an instrument for substantial perfection.For Avicenna, asceticism is a psychological process aimed at purifying the fixed essence of the soul; for Mulla Sadra, it is an ontological and existential movement toward the flourishing and intensification of the soul on its path to union with the Intellect and the realm of sanctity. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2183.html This research has been conducted to investigate the possibility of knowing the quiddity of God with an emphasis on Islamic traditions (Ḥadīth). Knowledge and cognition of the Divine Essence (Dhāt) in terms of its existence is attainable and is demonstrated through numerous proofs. However, knowledge of its quiddity (Māhiyyah)—insofar as it entails delimitations, determinations, and the affirmation of non-existences—is impossible concerning God, Who is exempt from all deficiency, non-existence, and limitation. This matter is also emphasized in the traditions, where reflection upon it is prohibited. Nevertheless, the Divine Essence, through its manifestation (Ẓuhūr) in levels and its acceptance of delimitations and determinations according to each stage, is manifested in the many names and manifestations (Mazāhir). Through this, knowledge of Him—or more precisely, knowledge of His manifestation—is made possible. This knowledge, relative to the level of manifestation, constitutes mediated knowledge of the Essence and is the only path to knowing Him. In this path, the most complete knowledge is attainable only through the most perfect of manifestations, namely the Perfect Human (al-Insān al-Kāmil), who is the Muhammadan Reality (al-Ḥaqīqah al-Muḥammadiyyah). This point is also confirmed by the traditions of the Infallible Imams. This research has been conducted using an analytical-descriptive method and library-based resources. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2172.html Among the narrations, there are many famous hadiths attributed to the Ahl al-Bayt (a.s.) with slight differences in vocabulary and theological, philosophical and mystical themes in narrational, theological, philosophical and mystical books and even jurisprudence that are worth pondering and need to be examined in terms of meaning; among them is this sacred hadith that says, "I have not hesitated or doubted in anything that I am the subject of, except in the death of a believer, for he does not like death and I do not like anything bad to happen to him." This hadith has been mentioned both independently and in conjunction with the famous hadith of the nearness of optional and obligatory works of supererogation, and is also mentioned in conjunction with some supplications. Now, the question is, what is meant by God's doubt? What interpretation have the scholars of hadith, jurists, theologians, philosophers and mystics presented? What is the collective meaning of these different interpretations? This research uses a descriptive-analytical method to validate the hadith and examine the sayings and perceptions, and shows that it is possible to present a reasonable interpretation of it by preserving the appearances of the words and using philosophical and mystical foundations. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2113.html In Islamic philosophy, the discussion of the immateriality of the soul (Tajarrud al-Nafs) constitutes one of the most fundamental and complex topics in philosophical anthropology, which has consistently engaged the attention of Muslim philosophers. Thinkers such as Avicenna, adducing various proofs, sought to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul. However, in the contemporary era, certain scholars—including Ayatollah Fayyāḍī—have undertaken a critical re-examination of these proofs, scrutinizing their foundations and premises and casting doubt upon their validity and completeness. Adopting an analytical-critical approach, the present research investigates the most significant critiques advanced by Fayyāḍī concerning Avicenna’s arguments for the soul’s immateriality. Among these critiques are the following: doubt concerning the indivisibility of intelligible forms, denial of the necessary connection between immateriality and indivisibility, challenge to the self-evidence of the distinction between degrees of perceptual intensity, rejection of the existential distinction between sensory and intellectual faculties based on the criterion of immateriality, dismissal of the “Flying Man” argument as unreal, objection to the manner in which cognitive forms are individuated given their attribution to a particular subject, and finally, denial of the correlation between immateriality and unity on the one hand and materiality and multiplicity on the other. The findings of this research indicate that most of these critiques suffer from serious logical and epistemological flaws and lack the demonstrative force to refute Avicenna’s cogent proofs for the immateriality of the soul. Consequently, the final analysis of this study emphasizes that the classical arguments of Islamic philosophy concerning the soul’s immateriality, despite certain challenges, retain their requisite coherence and demonstrative strength, and Fayyāḍī’s critiques lack the logical sufficiency to invalidate them. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2176.html How to use theoretical reason in understanding religious knowledge is one of the most important issues raised among Muslim thinkers. Sadr al-Din Qunavi is one of the greatest Muslim mystics who, by providing evidence, has sought to prove the shortcomings and inadequacies of theoretical reason in understanding religious knowledge and explaining its issues. In his view, theoretical reason is limited and restricted, its perceptions differ greatly from each other, and philosophers also disagree on many issues. Given that the perceptions of reason are general concepts and meanings, reason is not limited or restricted. Theoretical reason, using general premises and meanings, understands many religious knowledge, such as the return of all multiplicity to true unity, and explains demonstrably how multiplicity emerges from the true unit. Having a difference of opinion about a demonstrable subject does not invalidate theoretical reason in its perceptions. Rather, in this case, reason also proves the correctness or incorrectness of a subject by using axioms. In many of the arguments presented by Qunavi, there is confusion and fallacy between the rulings of the faculty of fear (which perceives partial meanings) and the evidence of theoretical reason (which perceives mere generalities). https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2204.html The relationship between the soul and cognitive forms (al-Ṣuwar al-ʿilmiyyah) and its analysis in Islamic philosophy has a long history. This research seeks to examine the role of the soul in relation to cognitive forms in Islamic philosophy, focusing on the perspectives of Mullā Ṣadrā and ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī. The method employed in this article is analytical-comparative, utilizing primary texts and philosophical commentaries. Mullā Ṣadrā, by establishing principles such as the substantial motion (al-Ḥarakah al-Jawhariyyah) of the soul, the primacy of existence (Aṣālat al-Wujūd), and the immateriality of cognitive forms (Tajarrud al-Ṣuwar al-ʿilmiyyah), was able to demonstrate that the soul, with respect to particular forms—namely, sensible and imaginal forms—is their source (Maṣdar); that is, the soul itself creates these particular forms. However, with respect to intellectual forms, the soul’s role is that of manifestation (Maẓharīyah). By regarding the soul as the source of particular forms, Mullā Ṣadrā addresses many of the problems concerning mental existence (al-Wujūd al-Dhihnī) and presents his philosophical solutions based upon this principle. This article also demonstrates that numerous later philosophers after Mullā Ṣadrā have followed him on this issue. However, based on his specific analysis of the nature of acquired knowledge (māhiyyat al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī) and the impossibility of the union of potency and act (Ittiḥād al-Quwwah wa al-Fiʿl), ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī considers the soul’s role in all forms to be that of manifestation. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2219.html در مقایسه با اوصافی چون «علم» و «ارادۀ» الهی که تاکنون از جوانب مختلف مورد بررسی قرار گرفته است، دربارۀ وصف «قدرت» خدا تحقیقات کمتری به انجام رسیده؛ از این‌رو، توضیح دیدگاه‌ها و ادلّۀ متکلّمان در خصوص چگونگی تعریف و اثبات قادریّت الهی همچنان در شمار اولویّت‌های پژوهشی در حوزۀ کلام اسلامی به‌شمار می‌آید. در همین راستا، در مقالۀ حاضر با استفاده از روش تحقیق تاریخی – تحلیلی نظرگاه‌ها و براهین گوناگونی که متکلّمان امامیّه در دورۀ تکوین و تکامل کلام فلسفی طی قرون هفتم تا یازدهم هجری، و بطور خاص متکلّمان مکتب حلّۀ متأخّر، در خصوص قدرت و اختیار الهی مطرح نموده‌اند تدوین و تشریح و تحلیل می‌شود. این جستار نمودار آن است که در آثار این متکلّمان، در مجموع، هفت استدلال به‌منظور اثبات قادریّت خداوند به‌معنای قادرِ مختار بودنِ او ارائه شده است که از میان آنها، یک استدلال، نَقلی و سایر دلایل، عقلیِ محض است. از این هفت استدلال، یک دلیل، به نفی جبر برون‌ذاتی از خداوند می‌پردازد، ولی شش دلیل دیگر با نفی جبر درون‌ذاتی از خدا، قادرِ مختار بودنِ او را به اثبات می‌رساند. همچنین، از میان پنج استدلال عقلیِ ناظر به نفی جبر درون‌ذاتی، یک استدلال، قادرِ مختار بودنِ خدا را بدون استناد به موجودات عالَم و صِرفاً به عنوان یکی از صفات کمالی او اثبات می‌کند، در حالی که در چهار استدلال دیگر با استناد به برخی از صفات مخلوقات یعنی حدوث، نظم و اِتقان، تغییر و تحوّل، و نیز عدم‌پذیری، قادریّت الهی نشان داده می‌شود. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2170.html Poetic language, owing to its unparalleled capacity for conveying profound concepts in a concise and pleasing expression, has long served as an eloquent medium for reflecting deep philosophical themes. The poetry collection (Dīvān) of ʿAllāmah Ḥasan-zādah Āmulī stands as a prominent example of this synthesis, manifesting the artistic integration of philosophy and literature. Employing a descriptive-analytical method and utilizing library-based resources, this research examines the manifestation of the principles of Transcendent Theosophy (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah) in the lyric poems (Ghazaliyyāt) of ʿAllāmah Ḥasan-zādah. The findings indicate that valuable philosophical principles such as the unity of the reality of existence and the multiplicity of its modes of manifestation, the pervasion of love in existence, the pervasion of knowledge and life in existence, the order, perfection, and optimality of the cosmic system, the union of the knower and the known (Ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa al-Maʿqūl), the relationship between the soul and the body, and the influence of character traits (Malakāt) on the formation of imaginal (Barzakhī) forms are beautifully reflected in ʿAllāmah’s lyric poems. Ultimately, this article attests that the lyric poems of ʿAllāmah Ḥasan-zādah represent a vivid manifestation of his philosophical insight and literary taste, serving as a sturdy bridge between Transcendent Theosophy and literature. It also emphasizes the great capacity of poetic language for expressing the most sublime philosophical concepts in an enduring and influential form. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2234.html Ismat Piyambran is one of the most important and important topics that are the essence and the essence of it, and it is the source of the difference of Islamic language, which is based on it. A workshop to edit a drama, opinions, and viewpoints in this particular topic. However, this is an important issue that can be addressed and looked into carefully; Where are the traces of the Brassas of Shiwa and Roshmandi's ingenuity, what did he do wrong? This is a descriptive and analytical investigation based on the basis of quantitative and qualitative studies, and with reference to various sources. This is an important interpretation of the Qur’an, meaning its interpretive verbal foundations. Erzyabi has severe cold effects. In order to check and track the image of his room in this place, it will not appear; This Qur’anic discussion is based on the infallibility of the prophets, its criticism, various exegetical speeches, in a sentence; Fanatic interpretation of texts, non-university in applied analysis, lack of philosophical interpretation and analysis, neglect of non-verbal Qur’an and content with comprehensive rational evidence, neglect of Intellectual evidence, and the outward appearances of the verses are sufficient for it https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2159.html Given the importance of substantial motion (al-Ḥarakah al-Jawhariyyah) and the essential transformation of the soul in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy, this research examines the relationship between human voluntary actions and the substantial motion of the soul. The main objective of this article is to investigate the role of human will and voluntary actions in directing the trajectory of the soul’s evolution. The research method is explanatory-analytical. The findings indicate that the substantial motion of humans encompasses both innate (Jibillī) and voluntary (Irādī) movements. Voluntary movement stems from practical intellect (al-ʿaql al-ʿamalī) and constitutes the basis for the growth of theoretical intellect (al-ʿaql al-Naẓarī) and the development of the soul’s essence. Furthermore, considering the inner and continuous movement of the soul, the repetition of voluntary actions leads, on the one hand, to the formation of soul’s traits (Malakāt Nafsānī), and on the other hand, determines the path and destination of the soul’s essential motion, which lays the groundwork for the progress or decline of the human existential substance. In fact, according to substantial motion, the human soul is in perpetual flux (Sayalān), and voluntary actions play a fundamental role in consciously directing its movement. Therefore, a precise understanding of the role of will and voluntary actions in Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy can serve as a suitable guide for improving the quality of human life and spirituality. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2227.html This study analyzes the impact of Mulla Sadra's gradual and fuzzy view of human truth on his final perspective regarding theoretical and practical intellect. Using a descriptive-analytical method and primary sources, the findings indicate that Sadra's philosophy is founded on the "primacy of existence" as a gradual and hierarchical reality. From this perspective, human being is also a single, hierarchical, and fuzzy truth called "soul" in one respect and "body" in another. The soul emerges from the substantial motion of the body, and their relationship is not dualistic but rather one of "union" and ultimately "unity"—the body is the lower, corporeal level of the soul, and the soul is the higher, spiritual level of the body.Based on this and the principle that "the soul is, in its unity, all faculties," the paper argues that a fuzzy view of human being prevents absolute boundaries between the soul's faculties. Consequently, the common distinction between theoretical intellect ( cognitive faculty) and practical intellect ( motivational faculty) is transformed in Sadra's thought. They are two dimensions or levels of a single reality called "intellect," just as soul and body are two levels of a single truth. Thus, theory is considered the higher level of practice, and practice the lower level of theory. The ultimate end of both is the same: attaining existential perfection and divine proximity. This research demonstrates that Sadra's fuzzy anthropology leads to an ontological unity of soul and body, and consequently, to aIdentity Unity of theoretical and practical intellect. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2300.html رابطه علم و دین از مسائل بنیادین و مناقشه‌برانگیز در تاریخ تفکر فلسفی، الهیاتی و علمی در غرب و جهان اسلام بوده است. پرسش اصلی این پژوهش آن است که آیا می‌توان الگویی معرفت‌شناختی و فلسفی ارائه کرد که ضمن حفظ استقلال نسبی علم و دین، از تعارض، تفکیک مطلق، تطبیق یک‌سویه یا التقاط میان آن‌ها پرهیز کرده و زمینه تعامل سازنده میان این دو را فراهم آورد؟ در پاسخ به این پرسش، مقاله حاضر چهار رویکرد اصلی در نسبت علم و دین - تعارض، تفکیک، تطبیق یک‌سویه و تلفیق - را تحلیل و نقد می‌کند و نشان می‌دهد که هر یک از این رویکردها با کاستی‌های معرفتی و روش‌شناختی جدی مواجه‌اند. سپس با تکیه بر ابرگرایش «تعامل‌گرایی فلسفی» و با بهره‌گیری از مبانی فلسفه اسلامی، به‌ویژه حکمت متعالیه، الگویی بدیل برای تبیین رابطه علم و دین ارائه می‌شود. دستاورد اصلی پژوهش آن است که فلسفه، به‌مثابه دانشی بنیادین و میانجی معرفتی، می‌تواند چارچوبی فراهم آورد که در آن علم و دین، نه در تقابل و نه در تفکیک کامل، بلکه در رابطه‌ای تعاملی، تکمیل‌گر و هم‌افزا قرار گیرند. بر اساس این رویکرد، علم و دین با حفظ تفاوت‌های روشی و قلمروی خود، قادر خواهند بود در فهم واقعیت، معنا و غایت هستی، یکدیگر را تقویت کنند. روش پژوهش کتابخانه‌ای و مبتنی بر تحلیل توصیفی–انتقادی است. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2214.html Mullā Fanārī is among the theosophical mystics whose most profound mystical positions are articulated in his work Miṣbāḥ al-Uns. One significant aspect of his metaphysical inquiry concerns the reality of time. In discussing this subject, Fanārī presents two distinct interpretations of what constitutes temporal reality, followe d by his critical c ommentary on one of them. These two interpretations are: (1) the intelligible form of succession between the prior and the posterior, and (2) the very actuality of succession betw een the prior and the posterior.Adopting a descriptive–analytical methodology, this study aims first to expound Fanārī’s position with precision and then to un dertake a critical evaluation thereof. The author’s view on time is analyzed and assessed through four principal considerations:The lack of any intelligible justification for the quantitative re lation between time and the motion of the ninth celestial sph ere;The incompatibility between the immaterial nature of succession (as posited in Fanārī’s first interpretation) and the inherently transi ent, corporeal essence of time itself;The problem of circularity entai led in his second interpretation of tem poral reality; andThe inaccuracy of denying the particularized attribution of Divine Names and Attributes to material e ntities. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2175.html Mullā Ṣadrā’s Proof of the Truthful (Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn) is one of the most influential arguments for the existence of God in Islamic philosophy. It is grounded in the primacy of existence, the gradation of being, and an ontological conception of causality, and thus differs fundamentally from essence-based and classical cosmological arguments. In contrast, Antony Flew, a leading figure in twentieth-century analytical atheism, developed influential critiques of theistic arguments, particularly those based on Aristotelian–Thomistic causality, the argument from design, and empirically oriented models of explanation.The main question of this study is whether Flew’s critiques, given their epistemological and semantic presuppositions, also apply to the ontological structure of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Proof of the Truthful. Using a conceptual and comparative method, this article examines the metaphysical foundations of Transcendent Philosophy and analytic philosophy of religion in order to assess the scope of Flew’s objections.The study argues that Flew’s critiques do not extend to the Proof of the Truthful because they presuppose an empirical and essence-based model of causality, whereas Ṣadrā’s argument is based on an analysis of existence qua existence, a graded structure of being, and the existential necessity of the Necessary Being. Consequently, the Proof of the Truthful operates at a different explanatory level and remains largely unaffected by Flew’s objections, while also offering resources for the contemporary reformulation of theistic arguments in philosophy of religion. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2209.html The present study, with an analytical-comparative approach, examines two anthropological approaches: abstract and physicalist, and their moral consequences. The main issue of the research is how the difference in the foundations of anthropology leads to the formation of distinct and sometimes conflicting moral theories. In the abstract perspective, which is derived from transcendental wisdom and the foundations of Islamic philosophy, man is considered a being with an abstract self-aspect who is endowed with inherent dignity, real agency, moral responsibility, and the ability to receive reward and punishment in the hereafter. In contrast, the physicalist approach, which is rooted in secular anthropology and contemporary cognitive sciences, considers man to be merely a material and biological entity whose entire behavior can be explained at the physical and neurological level. Therefore, concepts such as agency, absolute value, or moral justice lack a real basis in it. This research, based on the works of Islamic thinkers such as Allameh Tabatabaei and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and analyzing the views of thinkers such as Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Richard Dawkins, shows that accepting or denying the indivisibility of the soul seriously changes the moral, educational, and social foundations. The basic finding is that divine anthropology, due to its comprehensive view of the material and abstract dimensions of man, can present a more coherent, meaningful, and innate moral system based on innate dignity. Accordingly, returning to it is a strategic necessity in rebuilding moral and educational systems in the contemporary world. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2312.html Ibn Sīnā introduces the idea of genushood (jinsiyyah) in explaining the relation between gradational universals (kulliyyāt mushakkikah) and their instances within the Peripatetic tradition of Islamic philosophy. This notion is later criticized by Suhrawardī, who demonstrates that a gradational universal (kullī mushakkik) cannot logically function as a proximate genus (jins qarīb) for its inferiors, which must rather be regarded as specific essences (māhiyyāt naw‘iyyah) under it. Suhrawardī then proposes the concept of logical entailment of generality—that the gradational universal is necessarily more general (a‘amm) than its particulars—and applies this to wujūd (existence) and nūr (light), viewing them as necessarily more general than their instances. This idea reaches a more systematic form in the thought of Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, who, in responding to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s critique concerning the attribution of existence to the Necessary and the contingent, articulates the principle that existence is the most perfect necessary entailment (lāzim atamm) in relation to existential realities. However, this very notion becomes the basis for Ibn Kammūna’s well-known objection against the unity of the Divine. In response, Mullā Ṣadrā develops the doctrine of the gradation of the reality of existence (tashkīk fī ḥaqīqat al-wujūd), transforming the idea of gradation in the concept of existence into gradation in its reality. Tracing this intellectual development reveals a historically grounded understanding of how Muslim philosophers, from the fourth to the twelfth century AH, conceptualized the gradational nature of existence and its ontological implications. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2252.html he meaning of life is one of the most fundamental philosophical and psychological questions, referring to the purpose, value, and function of human life, and it plays a central role in an individual’s spiritual and psychological development. This study examines the foundations and components of the meaning of life in the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā and Viktor Frankl.From the perspective of Transcendent Philosophy (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah), Mullā Ṣadrā conceives the human being as a composite, dynamic entity engaged in substantial motion, who progresses beyond materiality and animal life toward intellectual and spiritual existence. The ultimate goal of human life in this view is nearness to God and annihilation in the Divine (fanāʾ fī Allāh). Within this framework, the value of life is contingent upon the intensity of existence and the immateriality of the soul, while the function of life is understood as a continuous process of realizing perfection and attaining spiritual elevation.Viktor Frankl, psychiatrist and founder of logotherapy, presents the human being as a free and responsible agent capable of discovering meaning and purpose through choice, responsibility, and meaningful life experiences. For Frankl, the value of life is grounded in the quality of human actualization, and its function lies in existential growth, resilience, and spiritual development.. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2297.html Man is a free being who has the ability to transcend to the highest levels of perfection. Anthropologists have different views on the "basic needs and prerequisites for the perfection of the human soul." The "objective of the research" is to express the basic needs and prerequisites for the perfection of the human soul and the prerequisites for achieving perfection from the perspectives of Mulla Sadra and Maslow, and to compare the views of these two thinkers. The research method is analytical and comparative. According to the research findings, according to Maslow's view, human needs are divided into two categories of deficiency needs, such as the need for food, and existential needs, such as the search for truth, and there is a kind of longitudinal order between human needs. According to Sadra's thinking, in order to achieve his true perfection, man must, on the one hand, satisfy the needs of the lower levels of the soul, the vegetable and animal souls; on the other hand, given the originality of the spiritual dimension, the most basic needs are related to his spiritual dimension. In order to move in the most basic levels of his own transcendence, man must recognize and satisfy the basic needs of his human soul. The prerequisites for human perfection at the level of the human soul are divided into six categories: 1) Attaining divine knowledge; 2) Performing transcendental actions; 3) Love and passion; 4) Faith; 5) A guide for the journey; 6) God's help and active intellect. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2263.html Islam attaches special importance to morality and early childhood (the golden age of education). In order to achieve a native-Islamic model for early childhood moral education, in addition to examining moral education in religious teachings (the Quran and Hadith), it is also necessary to examine the thoughts of Muslim thinkers in this period. Examining the views of Masha'i thinkers (the first Islamic school of education) in this case is one of the first steps in presenting a model. In this article, with the aim of examining the nature and why of moral education in early childhood, the works of Masha'i thinkers were examined using a descriptive-analytical method and the concept, goals, factors, and content of moral education in this period were identified. The findings indicate that; from the point of view of Masha'i thinkers, moral education of children in early childhood is not only possible and necessary, but it is not appropriate to neglect it. The ultimate goal of moral education in this period is happiness and some of its intermediate goals include; obedience and respect for parents, teaching ethics before other sciences, and helping and correcting manners. Effective factors in two categories; Human factors and environmental factors are introduced, and some of the most important virtues that the content of this course seeks to achieve are: contentment, patience, humility, chastity of speech, and chastity of the abdomen. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2245.html .This research explores the challenge of "moral agency" in Artificial Intelligence (AI) through the lens of "Nature" in Ayatollah Shahabadi's philosophical mysticism. While dominant AI ethics paradigms focus on computational, utilitarian, or reinforcement learning models, this paper raises the fundamental question: can an artificial system devoid of divine "Fitrat" possess genuine moral understanding and agency, or is it merely simulating morality?. Using a descriptive-analytical method, the study first explicates the foundations of Fitrat as the root of moral intuition in Shahabadi's thought, emphasizing five intuitive references: knowledge, love, discovery, comfort, and freedom . Findings indicate that human moral agency is grounded in "presential knowledge" and an "intrinsic inclination toward perfection". Conversely, the technical analysis reveals that current AI models, relying on mathematical "objective functions" and statistical correlations, lack the conceptual infrastructure for semantic understanding and moral intuition . Through a comparative analysis, the article argues that due to the absence of inner consciousness and innate inclination, AI is, at best, a "simulated moral agent" or a "stochastic parrot" that merely reproduces the appearance of moral behavior. Ultimately, this fundamental distinction between "Innate Ethics" and "Algorithmic Ethics" necessitates redefining AI as a subservient tool rather than an autonomous agent in technological governance. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2313.html This study adopts an analytical and comparative approach to examine the concept of happiness (saʿāda) in the thought of Mullā Ṣadrā and Lorin Besser, aiming to show how these two theoretical frameworks—despite their fundamental differences in metaphysical foundations and methodological orientations—offer distinct yet structurally comparable accounts of human flourishing and well-being. Within Transcendent Philosophy (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliyya), happiness is conceived as an ontological reality grounded in substantial motion, the intensification of being, and the unity of intellect, intellector, and intellected. Human perfection is thus realized through knowledge, rational contemplation, and the acquisition of virtues, guiding the soul toward ultimate truth. By contrast, Besser understands happiness as a eudaimonic concept rooted in human flourishing, emerging through interpersonal relationships, experiential self-knowledge, and the actualization of individual capacities. Drawing on positive psychology, he interprets happiness as a this-worldly phenomenon dependent upon life satisfaction, flourishing, and subjective well-being. The findings of this study indicate that both thinkers link happiness to the notion of development or perfection; however, while Mullā Ṣadrā frames this development within a metaphysical hierarchy of being, Besser articulates it through an empirical, psychological, and earth-centered perspective. Consequently, by elucidating both the structural affinities and the foundational divergences between these two intellectual systems, this research opens a new avenue for dialogue between philosophical theology and contemporary psychology. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2314.html Anthropology occupies a fundamental position in Nietzsche’s thought and forms the basis of many of his ethical views. By rejecting divine authority and denying any fixed essence for human beings, Nietzsche conceives of the human as a being who must himself create the meaning and values of his own life. From this perspective, fitrah or innate dispositions have no significance in human nature, and the human being is defined primarily by the will to power. Adopting an analytical–critical approach, this article first explicates the main components of Nietzsche’s anthropology and then examines them in light of the theory of fitrah in Islamic theology. Subsequently, the theory of fitrah is introduced as one of the central pillars of Islamic anthropology, and its role in explaining human identity, inclinations, and ultimate purpose is explored. The findings of the study indicate that Nietzsche’s anthropology, due to its neglect of the innate and divine dimension of the human being, faces serious challenges in accounting for the meaning of life and human dignity. In contrast, the theory of fitrah, while acknowledging human dynamism, also affirms the directedness of human existence and thus offers a more coherent and meaningful conception of the human being. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2310.html primitive (ḥamli awwalī) and common predication (ḥamli shā'iʿ) occasionally functions as a predicate of the subject, and occasionally as a predicate itself. Each of these two modalities carries its own specific implications and gives rise to divergent consequences in philosophical inquiries. Allāmah Tabāṭabā’ī employs the concepts of conceptual entailment and instantiation in his writings, endeavoring to resolve philosophical issues such as mental existence and the apprehension of absolute non-being through their application. Given that comprehending and evaluating Allāmah's terminology within these contexts necessitates understanding which modality of entailment he utilizes in each discussion, this research seeks to examine the patterns of conceptual entailment and instantiation employed by Allāmah and to assess the viability of his approach. The significance of this investigation lies in issues such as theories of truth and the co-substantiality of substance and existence, both of which are contingent upon the proper application of conceptual entailment and instantiation. The research findings indicate that Allāmah accorded limited attention to the dichotomy between conceptual entailment and instantiation, exhibiting, at times, conflicting viewpoints.  The consequence of this lack of attention to the distinction is that Allāmah's perspective on mental existence encounters challenges; in such a way as to jeopardize his theory of truth. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2298.html Mental existence is considered one of the fundamental pillars of epistemology in Islamic philosophy. Sadr al-Muta'allihin Shirazi is regarded as one of the defenders of this theory, who has presented numerous arguments to prove it. This theory, which has been predominantly accepted by Islamic philosophers, has faced serious challenges in the contemporary era from the School of Separation and its followers. In this context, Mirza Jawad Tehrani has explicitly presented arguments rejecting this theory, while Mirza Mahdi Isfahani, the founder of the School of Separation, although not directly, has spoken in such a manner within his views that the outcome is the elimination of mental existence from the human epistemological framework. The present study, aiming to examine and analyze these challenges, first provides a coherent exposition of the views and arguments of both sides, and then, relying on rational methods and philosophical analyses, defends the theory of mental existence. The findings of this article indicate that the objections raised by the School of Separation are fundamentally not applicable to the theory of mental existence, and the alternatives they propose not only fail to explain the mechanism of knowledge but also lead to internal contradictions and the rendering meaningless of propositions that imply the ascription of attributes to non-existents. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2311.html In recent decades, philosophical hermeneutics, grounded in ontological premises—most notably in the thought of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer—has brought about a fundamental shift in theories of textual understanding and interpretation. By emphasizing concepts such as Dasein, pre-understanding, and the fusion of horizons, this approach redefines the interpreter not as an external observer but as an integral participant in the process of meaning formation. While such a framework opens new horizons for the interpretation of human and historical texts, its application to religious texts raises serious epistemological and methodological challenges, including the weakening of textual objectivity, the marginalization of authorial (divine) intent, and the tendency toward interpretive relativism. Employing a descriptive–analytical method with a critical orientation, this article examines the implications of philosophical hermeneutics for the interpretation of religious texts and argues that although the historicity and situatedness of understanding are undeniable features of human cognition, their unqualified extension to all levels of meaning—particularly in revelatory texts—leads to interpretive subjectivism and arbitrary readings. The findings suggest that a legitimate and productive engagement with philosophical hermeneutics in the domain of religious interpretation requires a critical revision of its radical assumptions and a principled integration with established rational and transmitted interpretive criteria. Such an approach makes it possible to preserve the ontological depth of understanding while maintaining relative semantic stability and rational evaluability among competing interpretations. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2301.html This study aims to conduct a comparative analysis of the extent of convergence and divergence between the views of two prominent interpreters of Transcendent Philosophy (al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah), namely Hakim Sabzavari and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, regarding the explanation of the mode of representation (ḥikāyah) of quiddity (māhiyyah) with respect to external existence. The research adopts a textual and interpretive method based on close analysis of the primary philosophical texts.The findings indicate that, at the ontological level, both thinkers concur in denying the external realization of quiddity and affirm that quiddity is merely a mental concept. However, a fundamental divergence emerges at the epistemological level. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli maintains that quiddity represents existence only secondarily and metaphorically (ḥikāyah bi’l-ʿaraḍ wa’l-majāz), and that its abstraction depends on the representational function of the concept of existence itself. In contrast, Sabzavari holds that quiddity genuinely represents limited existence and regards the cognition of quiddities as cognition of the real modes of existence.This divergence demonstrates that Sabzavari’s interpretation, from an epistemological perspective, goes beyond the notion of merely metaphorical representation and attributes to quiddity a genuine representational function with respect to existence. Consequently, although Ayatollah Javadi Amoli seeks to align his interpretation with Sabzavari’s views, textual analysis reveals that Sabzavari’s position constitutes a distinct epistemological stance. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2303.html Explaining how sensory inputs yield coherent perceptual forms constituted an epistemological crisis of nineteenth-century elementarist psychology. This crisis surfaced in the inefficacy of its assumptions—especially the “constancy hypothesis” and the “mosaic hypothesis”—and in Ernst Mach’s difficulty accounting for form. In standard historiography, Christian von Ehrenfels’s 1890 essay on “Gestalt Qualities” is presented as resolving this crisis and as a first step toward holistic approaches to perception. Drawing on the “Active Mind” tradition and contemporary critical scholarship, and adopting an analytic-archaeological approach, this article challenges this view. It argues that Ehrenfels’s proposal was not a decisive break with elementarism but its paradoxical culmination. A close analysis of his concepts, especially his “two-stage ontology” and “one-sided dependency,” shows that he remains committed to an additive logic of “parts plus a quality,” treating organization as an external, posterior factor. This impasse can be traced to the cosmological dualism in Ehrenfels’s thought and his account of the origin of form. The resulting framework opposes the Berlin School of Gestalt psychology (Wertheimer and Koffka), which defends the priority of the whole over the parts. The study’s contribution is twofold: First, it corrects Ehrenfels’s historical position as a limit case of the old paradigm rather than the immediate starting point of the new one. Second, it reconceives the transition to Gestalt theory as an epistemological shift from an additive dualism of form and matter to a structural unity in the organization of the perceptual field. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2295.html This study focuses on a central issue in the philosophy of religion, namely the relationship between knowledge, moral virtue, and the epistemic responsibility of the knowing agent, and provides a comparative analysis of the concept of ḥikmah in the Qur’an and the foundational epistemic concepts in ancient Greek philosophy-sophia, phronesis, and episteme. In the Greek tradition, a structural distinction between theoretical knowledge and practical wisdom is observed, which can lead to a dualism between knowledge and ethics. Employing Linda Zagzebski’s framework of responsibility-centered virtue epistemology and a comparative-analytical method, this paper demonstrates that Qur’anic ḥikmah presents an integrated model in which theoretical knowledge, practical judgment, and moral virtue are intrinsically interconnected. The findings indicate that by incorporating the element of “epistemic responsibility”-manifested in the Qur’anic linkage of wisdom with purification, piety, and social guidance-ḥikmah can be reconstructed as a philosophical model addressing the historical gap between knowledge and ethics in the philosophy of religion. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2320.html The compatibility and harmony between individual identity and collective identity is one of the fundamental challenges in the intersection of philosophy and social sciences. With the aim of achieving a pattern of harmony between these two levels of identity, this research reexamines the ontological and anthropological (interpretive and philosophical) foundations of Allameh Tabataba'i. The findings of the research show that Allameh's thought, based on "authenticity" and "scepticism of existence," formulates individual identity in the form of an "independent self" and collective identity in the form of a "relational self." Although in the primitive view, there is a kind of duality between the "validity of society" in philosophical discussions and the "realness of society" in Allameh's interpretive discussions, But by analyzing the “principle of employment” and “perceptions of credit,” it becomes clear that society is not merely a contract, but rather a “true combination of souls and wills.” Within this framework, harmony between individual and collective identity is ensured through the three axes of “existential evolution,” “social justice,” and “unity in purpose (wilayah);In such a way that individual perfection is the driving force for collective advancement and a healthy social environment is the basis for individual perfection. This research is qualitative in nature and conducted using a descriptive-analytical method;Information was also collected through a library method and by taking notes from the central works of Allamah Tabataba'i (including Tafsir al-Mizan, Bidayah al-Hikmah, and Usul al-Falsa and the Method of Realism) and her prominent commentators, such as Shahid Motahari. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2307.html Islamic philosophy education in the seminary tradition has relied on texts shaping the "faculty of philosophical understanding." Recently, with its shift to academia, Mullā Hādī Sabzavārī's Sharḥ al-Manẓūma has been evaluated against modern textbook criteria. Moqaddam (2023/1402), from this perspective, deems its conciseness, versified form, and linguistic complexity as causes of educational inefficacy. This study asks whether these judgments arise from the text's inherent weakness or from imposing a framework incompatible with traditional texts. Using conceptual-functional analysis and a comparative approach, it distinguishes between "information-oriented" (modern) and "cultivation-oriented" (Islamic philosophical tradition) educational models, then reinterprets Moqaddam's critiques within these frameworks. Findings indicate that features like conciseness, poetic form, mystical elements, and interdisciplinary references—deemed "learning disruptors" in the modern paradigm—serve an educational role in the philosophical tradition. Within the teacher-centered system, exegesis, and scholarly dialogue (mubāḥatha), they foster conceptual practice, technical language familiarity, and readiness for foundational texts like Asfār. Distinguishing "inherent difficulties" (from the textual tradition's logic) from "accidental difficulties" (from content arrangement), the article defends the former while allowing for the latter's reform. Thus, the disagreement over Sharḥ al-Manẓūma's efficacy stems from differing educational paradigms, requiring a framework that considers both the tradition's internal logic and contemporary standards for analyzing Islamic philosophical texts. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2308.html توحید در اندیشه دینی، اساس کمال وجودی انسان است که با هماهنگ ساختن عقل و نفس، مسیر ‏شکوفایی استعدادهای انسانی را هموار می‌کند. در مقابل شرک، به عنوان «ظلم وجودی»، با تجزیه حقیقت ‏هستی، انسان را دچار پراکندگی و غفلت از مبدأ مطلق می‌کند. در حالی که «شرک» غالباً گناهی اعتقادی ‏تلقی می‌شود، توصیف قرآنی آن به مثابه «ظلم عظیم» به ساحتی عمیق‌تر و وجودی اشاره دارد. این پژوهش ‏با هدف تبیین این بُعد هستی‌شناختی، استدلال می‌کند که شرک صرفاً یک خطای عبادی نیست، بلکه ‏‏«ظلمی وجودی» به نفس است که با تجزیه حقیقت و انحراف از فطرت توحیدی، مسیر کمال انسان را مسدود ‏می‌سازد. این تحقیق با روش توصیفی-تحلیلی با اتکاء به مبانی حکمت متعالیه ملاصدرا، این مفهوم را از پنج ‏منظر هستی‌شناختی، انسان‌شناختی، معرفت‌شناختی، کمال‌شناختی و اخلاقی-حقوقی واکاوی می‌کند. ‏یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد که شرک با نشاندنِ موجودِ محدود در جایگاهِ وجودِ مطلق، به یک خطای بنیادین در ‏ساختار واقعیت منجر می‌شود که پیامدهای تکوینی آن، محرومیت از هدف آفرینش، زوال آرامش وجودی، ‏سلب قابلیت دریافت آمرزش الهی و سقوط کرامت انسانی است. در نهایت، این بازخوانی فلسفی-وجودی، افقی ‏تحلیلی برای مواجهه با چالش‌های انسان معاصر، از جمله بحران هویت و ازخودبیگانگی، ارائه می‌دهد‎.‎‏ ‏ https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2220.html Unlike attributes such as divine knowledge and will, which have been extensively explored in philosophical and theological studies, the attribute of divine power has received comparatively less attention. The various arguments presented by theologians to affirm this attribute have not been thoroughly examined. This study investigates and compares the views of prominent early Imāmī theologians from the fourth and fifth centuries AH regarding divine power. It demonstrates that the reasoning employed by hadith-based theologians—those aligned with the traditionalist school—differs significantly from the rationalist approaches of the early and later Baghdad schools. Shaykh al-Kulaynī and Shaykh al-Ṣadūq, relying on transmitted reports, argue that divine power, like other essential attributes of God, must be interpreted apophatically (via negativa), meaning that power should be understood as the negation of its opposite. Thus, God's omnipotence signifies His absolute freedom from weakness or incapacity. In contrast, theologians of the Baghdad school offer a cataphatic (positive) interpretation, asserting that divine power implies the possibility of God performing actions and bringing about effects. For these theologians, the only valid method to prove divine power is through reference to God's acts. They employ analogical reasoning (qiyās al-ghāʾib ʿala al-shāhid), inferring the unseen from the seen, to establish God's omnipotence. https://ipd.razavi.ac.ir/article_2299.html The position of reason in philosophy and theology is different, because these two sciences differ in subject, method, and goal. The goal of the theologian is to defend his religious teachings against the enemy, and to achieve this goal, he uses the tools of reason and revelation. Sayyid Murtaza Alam al-Huda (355-436 AH), a prominent Shiite theologian and jurist, has tried to establish a dialogue between reason and revelation in his theological epistemology, and influenced by the Mu'tazilites' theology, he favors the side of reason in many of his theological issues, but since he is an Imami school, he respects the opinion of narration and sacrifices reason in the face of revelation. In this article, we have approached the theological epistemology of Sayyid Murtaza with an analytical and critical perspective. By citing examples of his views on the application of reason and narration in theological issues, we first examined the similarities and perhaps their objectivity with the views of Qadi Abdul Jabbar the Mu'tazilite. Then, by searching for traces of reason and revelation in the text of his theological thoughts, we have answered these questions: Can, from Sayyid Murtaza's perspective, all theological issues be considered subject to the rule of reason or pure revelational evidence? In this case, what is the relationship between reason and narration?