Abstract
This research employs an analytical‑critical method to examine and evaluate the effectiveness of Fayyāḍ al-Lāhījī’s defenses of Muḥaqqiq al‑Khafrī’s proofs for the Necessary Existent (Wājib al‑Wujūd) in the face of Mullā Ṣadrā’s critiques. The present study focuses on a comparative analysis of al-Lāhījī’s formulations – including his conceptual distinctions concerning essential (Dhātī) and temporal (Zamānī) priority and the principle that “the possible qua possible stands in need of a cause” – in light of Mullā Ṣadrā’s fundamental objections. The results indicate that al-Lāhījī, by offering a methodical reconstruction, strengthened the foundation of al‑Khafrī’s reasoning. However, according to the findings, his defenses are deficient in certain respects, particularly in distinguishing existence qua existent from existence qua attribute, when compared to Mullā Ṣadrā’s responses. It is concluded that al-Lāhījī’s contribution represents a methodological effort at foundational reconstruction, but the key contribution and distinctive feature of this research reside in providing a precise, documented, critical assessment of the sufficiency of those defenses against Mullā Ṣadrā’s final critique, thereby highlighting these limitations in the evolution of the ontological proof.
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