Abstract

A significant strand of contemporary discourse on artificial intelligence ethics tends to reduce moral judgment to computable rules and formalised procedures. Approaches such as utilitarian optimisation and feedback‑based alignment generally presuppose that ethical values can be adequately represented through mathematical functions and algorithmic mechanisms. Rather than assessing the technical feasibility or performance of such models, the present study shifts the discussion to a more fundamental level by addressing an ontological question: can an entity that lacks inner experience, intuitive awareness, and an intrinsic orientation toward moral perfection genuinely qualify as a moral agent? To examine this question, the article draws upon the mystical‑philosophical thought of Ḥakīm Shāhābādī and employs his theory of fiṭrah (innate human disposition) as an anthropological and evaluative framework. An analysis of this theory reveals that moral action, in Shāhābādī’s view, is not the result of formal rule‑following or external compliance, but emerges from the actualisation of multiple inner and intuitive dimensions of human nature, including presential knowledge, love, discovery, and the inclination toward freedom and comfort. By contrast, an examination of the internal structure of artificial intelligence systems demonstrates that their operations are grounded in objective functions, statistical correlations, and data‑driven optimisation, without access to inner experience or existential motivation. The study therefore concludes that artificial intelligence, even in its most advanced forms, cannot be regarded as a moral agent in the strict philosophical and jurisprudential sense. At best, it functions as a simulator of ethically patterned behaviour rather than as a bearer of genuine moral responsibility. Consequently, delegating moral judgment to such systems risks obscuring the fundamental distinction between data processing and moral awareness. Addressing the ethical challenges posed by emerging technologies thus requires reaffirming the central role of human moral agency and grounding technological governance in a robust understanding of human nature.