Abstract

This study aims to conduct a comparative analysis of the extent of convergence and divergence between the views of two prominent interpreters of Transcendent Philosophy (al-ḥikmah al-mutaʿāliyah), namely Hakim Sabzavari and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, regarding the explanation of the mode of representation (ḥikāyah) of quiddity (māhiyyah) with respect to external existence. The research adopts a textual and interpretive method based on close analysis of the primary philosophical texts.

The findings indicate that, at the ontological level, both thinkers concur in denying the external realization of quiddity and affirm that quiddity is merely a mental concept. However, a fundamental divergence emerges at the epistemological level. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli maintains that quiddity represents existence only secondarily and metaphorically (ḥikāyah bi’l-ʿaraḍ wa’l-majāz), and that its abstraction depends on the representational function of the concept of existence itself. In contrast, Sabzavari holds that quiddity genuinely represents limited existence and regards the cognition of quiddities as cognition of the real modes of existence.

This divergence demonstrates that Sabzavari’s interpretation, from an epistemological perspective, goes beyond the notion of merely metaphorical representation and attributes to quiddity a genuine representational function with respect to existence. Consequently, although Ayatollah Javadi Amoli seeks to align his interpretation with Sabzavari’s views, textual analysis reveals that Sabzavari’s position constitutes a distinct epistemological stance.