Abstract

primitive (ḥamli awwalī) and common predication (ḥamli shā'iʿ) occasionally functions as a predicate of the subject, and occasionally as a predicate itself. Each of these two modalities carries its own specific implications and gives rise to divergent consequences in philosophical inquiries. Allāmah Tabāṭabā’ī employs the concepts of conceptual entailment and instantiation in his writings, endeavoring to resolve philosophical issues such as mental existence and the apprehension of absolute non-being through their application. Given that comprehending and evaluating Allāmah's terminology within these contexts necessitates understanding which modality of entailment he utilizes in each discussion, this research seeks to examine the patterns of conceptual entailment and instantiation employed by Allāmah and to assess the viability of his approach. The significance of this investigation lies in issues such as theories of truth and the co-substantiality of substance and existence, both of which are contingent upon the proper application of conceptual entailment and instantiation. The research findings indicate that Allāmah accorded limited attention to the dichotomy between conceptual entailment and instantiation, exhibiting, at times, conflicting viewpoints.  The consequence of this lack of attention to the distinction is that Allāmah's perspective on mental existence encounters challenges; in such a way as to jeopardize his theory of truth.