Abstract
Epistemologists have adopted different approaches to the role of emotions in moral knowledge; some of them consider any influence of emotions on the formation of beliefs to be a cognitive deficit. On the contrary, another group emphasizes the positive role of emotions in deriving moral laws. Accordingly, the aim of the present study is a philosophical and demonstrative analysis in the field of meta-ethics discussions on how emotions imply moral laws and the feasibility of extracting moral laws from them. Using a descriptive-analytical method and document collection, this study shows that innate emotions, unlike instinctive emotions, include three characteristics: "conscious understanding of perfection", "consistency of perfectionism", and "negation of selfishness and desire for others". Also, moral emotions share three characteristics with moral laws: "immutability", "institutionalization in humans to achieve perfection", and "negation of selfishness and desire for others". Therefore, the research findings indicate that innate emotions have the necessary ability and capacity to imply moral laws to achieve the ultimate goal of morality, namely divine proximity.
Main Subjects