The distinction between the soul, mind, and body, or brain, is a key issue in anthropology that has significant implications for both philosophical and religious knowledge. One of the arguments for substance dualism is the "personal identity argument," which has been addressed by both Islamic and Western philosophers. In contrast, physicists have sought to critique this argument and present a materialistic view of the continuity of the soul throughout life. They point to the stability of brain neurons, the unity of the body or brain's structure and function, or the continuous spatio-temporal existence of the body as the basis for personal identity. This article first strengthens the empirical foundation of the argument using new findings in molecular biology and neuroscience. Then, by applying phenomenology to personal identity and utilizing philosophical and analytical principles (such as distinguishing between real and nominal unity and between doubt and definition), it attempts to answer the criticisms of physicalism.
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Sajedi, H. (2023). Critique of Physicalism’s Response to the Problem of Bodily Change in the Personal Identity Argument. Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 18(33), 149-178. doi: 10.30513/ipd.2024.6238.1546
MLA
Sajedi, H. . "Critique of Physicalism’s Response to the Problem of Bodily Change in the Personal Identity Argument", Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 18, 33, 2023, 149-178. doi: 10.30513/ipd.2024.6238.1546
HARVARD
Sajedi, H. (2023). 'Critique of Physicalism’s Response to the Problem of Bodily Change in the Personal Identity Argument', Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 18(33), pp. 149-178. doi: 10.30513/ipd.2024.6238.1546
CHICAGO
H. Sajedi, "Critique of Physicalism’s Response to the Problem of Bodily Change in the Personal Identity Argument," Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 18 33 (2023): 149-178, doi: 10.30513/ipd.2024.6238.1546
VANCOUVER
Sajedi, H. Critique of Physicalism’s Response to the Problem of Bodily Change in the Personal Identity Argument. Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 2023; 18(33): 149-178. doi: 10.30513/ipd.2024.6238.1546