A new presentation of this identity argument for Substance dualism

Document Type : Research

Author

research institute of hawzeh & university

Abstract

The nature of " ego " is one of the important discussions in the philosophy of mind , which can play a key role in the thought system of any philosopher. From the past, the argument of personal identity has been raised as an argument in favor of Substance dualism . In the contemporary philosophy of mind, with the introduction of certain thought experiments, a new form of this argument has been formed. This article analyzes this new argument . We will show that with Shoemaker's thought experiment ( body swapping ) it is not possible to prove Substance dualism, but with Williams's brain splitting experiment and Swinburne's experiment ( replacement of half of the brains of identical twins ) it can be proved . On the other hand, physicalist solutions such as " modification of the criterion of identity " and " multiple possession " lead to unacceptable consequences.

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