The nature of the 'self' is a significant topic in the philosophy of mind and can play a pivotal role in any philosopher's intellectual framework. Historically, the Personal Identity Argument has been advanced as an argument in favor of Substance Dualism. In contrast, Physicalism attempts to avoid accepting an immaterial reality by proposing a material criterion for personal identity. However, in contemporary philosophy of mind, the introduction of certain thought experiments has given rise to a new form of this argument, which presents a fresh challenge to Physicalism. This article investigates this new line of reasoning. We will demonstrate that while Shoemaker's (Body Swap) thought experiment cannot substantiate Substance Dualism, Williams' Brain Division experiment and Swinburne's (Half-Brain Transplant in Identical Twins) experiment can be used to argue for it. Conversely, Physicalist solutions such as "revising the identity criterion" and "multiple possession" lead to unacceptable consequences.
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Sajedi, H. (2024). A New Formulation of the Personal Identity Argument in Favor of Substance Dualism. Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 19(34), 79-108. doi: 10.30513/ipd.2025.6592.1570
MLA
Sajedi, H. . "A New Formulation of the Personal Identity Argument in Favor of Substance Dualism", Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 19, 34, 2024, 79-108. doi: 10.30513/ipd.2025.6592.1570
HARVARD
Sajedi, H. (2024). 'A New Formulation of the Personal Identity Argument in Favor of Substance Dualism', Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 19(34), pp. 79-108. doi: 10.30513/ipd.2025.6592.1570
CHICAGO
H. Sajedi, "A New Formulation of the Personal Identity Argument in Favor of Substance Dualism," Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 19 34 (2024): 79-108, doi: 10.30513/ipd.2025.6592.1570
VANCOUVER
Sajedi, H. A New Formulation of the Personal Identity Argument in Favor of Substance Dualism. Islamic Philosophical Doctrines, 2024; 19(34): 79-108. doi: 10.30513/ipd.2025.6592.1570
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