Scientific Journal
Abstract
In Islamic philosophy, the discussion of the immateriality of the soul (Tajarrud al-Nafs) constitutes one of the most fundamental and complex topics in philosophical anthropology, which has consistently engaged the attention of Muslim philosophers. Thinkers such as Avicenna, adducing various proofs, sought to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul. However, in the contemporary era, certain scholars—including Ayatollah Fayyāḍī—have undertaken a critical re-examination of these proofs, scrutinizing their foundations and premises and casting doubt upon their validity and completeness. Adopting an analytical-critical approach, the present research investigates the most significant critiques advanced by Fayyāḍī concerning Avicenna’s arguments for the soul’s immateriality. Among these critiques are the following: doubt concerning the indivisibility of intelligible forms, denial of the necessary connection between immateriality and indivisibility, challenge to the self-evidence of the distinction between degrees of perceptual intensity, rejection of the existential distinction between sensory and intellectual faculties based on the criterion of immateriality, dismissal of the “Flying Man” argument as unreal, objection to the manner in which cognitive forms are individuated given their attribution to a particular subject, and finally, denial of the correlation between immateriality and unity on the one hand and materiality and multiplicity on the other. The findings of this research indicate that most of these critiques suffer from serious logical and epistemological flaws and lack the demonstrative force to refute Avicenna’s cogent proofs for the immateriality of the soul. Consequently, the final analysis of this study emphasizes that the classical arguments of Islamic philosophy concerning the soul’s immateriality, despite certain challenges, retain their requisite coherence and demonstrative strength, and Fayyāḍī’s critiques lack the logical sufficiency to invalidate them.
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