Scientific Journal
Abstract
The relationship between the soul and cognitive forms (al-Ṣuwar al-ʿilmiyyah) and its analysis in Islamic philosophy has a long history. This research seeks to examine the role of the soul in relation to cognitive forms in Islamic philosophy, focusing on the perspectives of Mullā Ṣadrā and ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī. The method employed in this article is analytical-comparative, utilizing primary texts and philosophical commentaries. Mullā Ṣadrā, by establishing principles such as the substantial motion (al-Ḥarakah al-Jawhariyyah) of the soul, the primacy of existence (Aṣālat al-Wujūd), and the immateriality of cognitive forms (Tajarrud al-Ṣuwar al-ʿilmiyyah), was able to demonstrate that the soul, with respect to particular forms—namely, sensible and imaginal forms—is their source (Maṣdar); that is, the soul itself creates these particular forms. However, with respect to intellectual forms, the soul’s role is that of manifestation (Maẓharīyah). By regarding the soul as the source of particular forms, Mullā Ṣadrā addresses many of the problems concerning mental existence (al-Wujūd al-Dhihnī) and presents his philosophical solutions based upon this principle. This article also demonstrates that numerous later philosophers after Mullā Ṣadrā have followed him on this issue. However, based on his specific analysis of the nature of acquired knowledge (māhiyyat al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī) and the impossibility of the union of potency and act (Ittiḥād al-Quwwah wa al-Fiʿl), ʿAllāmah Ṭabāṭabāʾī considers the soul’s role in all forms to be that of manifestation.
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