Explaining Ṣadrā’s Response to Joseph Levine’s Explanatory Gap Riddle Based on the Doctrine of Abstraction of Perception

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD student in Islamic Philosophy at Baqir al-Olum University

2 Professor at Baqir al-Olum University

Abstract

Considering Ṣadrā’s view on the abstraction of perception and the arguments he has put forward, a reasoned answer to the riddle of the explanatory gap is provided. Ṣadrā’s explanation of perception and the soul is included in the dualistic interpretation, but his interpretation justifies the issue of perception and its quality more coherently, considering the abstract dignity of the soul and the fact that the soul is the source of any consciousness. On the other hand, Levin emphasizes the distinction between the nature of pain and the neural process by formulating the riddle of the explanatory gap. In his view, an explanatory gap is created between the realization of the phenomenon of perception and the similar neural processes that this gap cannot be filled based on existing neural data. The purpose of this study is to investigate the success of transcendent wisdom (Ḥikmat al-muta'aliya) in providing a reasoned answer to this issue and filling the above-mentioned explanatory gap through the rules of transcendental wisdom. Ṣadrā’s view of the abstractness of perception seems to provide a reasoned answer to the riddle of the explanatory gap by presenting it in a dualistic interpretation and by looking at the soul as a truth distinct from the material body but at the same time united with it.

Keywords


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