Authors
1
PhD Candidate, Department of Islamic Theology, Go.C., Islamic Azad University, Gorgan, Iran
2
Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Theology, Go.C., Islamic Azad University, Gorgan, Iran
3
Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Theology, Shahroud University of Medical Sciences, Shahroud. Iran
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Document Type : Research
Abstract
The question of cognitive capacity in Artificial Intelligence (AI) constitutes one of the fundamental challenges at the intersection of the philosophy of mind and modern cognitive technology. This article seeks to critique the foundation of knowledge (ʿilm) in AI systems based on the theory of the unity of the knower and the known (Ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa al-Maʿqūl) in Transcendent Theosophy (al-Ḥikmah al-Mutaʿāliyah). Employing an analytical-comparative approach and relying on the principles of Islamic philosophy, the present research undertakes a conceptual and critical examination of the nature of knowledge in AI and its comparison with presential knowledge (al-ʿilm al-Ḥuḍūrī) in Ṣadrian philosophy. In the theory of the unity of the knower and the known, knowledge is a mode of existence that entails agency, the immateriality of the soul (Tajarrud al-Nafs), and the presence of the known to the knower, whereas AI merely processes data without awareness or presential perception. This distinction not only reveals that knowledge in AI lacks existential foundation and constitutes mere quasi-perception, but also carries epistemological and ethical implications. According to the presented analysis, machine intelligence systems, due to their lack of presential knowledge, are devoid of characteristics such as intention (Niyyah), purpose (Qaṣd), and moral responsibility. Consequently, jurisprudential concepts such as intent (Qaṣd) and deliberateness (Taʿammud), which are based on conscious agency, are not applicable to AI, and human legal and ethical judgments cannot be attributed to them.
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