Criticism of the position of theoretical reason in religious knowledge from the perspective of Sadr al-Din Qonavi

Document Type : Research

Authors

1 University of Shahed

2 PhD in Islamic Philosophy and Theology from Shiraz University

Abstract

How to use theoretical reason in understanding religious knowledge is one of the most important issues raised among Muslim thinkers. Sadr al-Din Qunavi is one of the greatest Muslim mystics who, by providing evidence, has sought to prove the shortcomings and inadequacies of theoretical reason in understanding religious knowledge and explaining its issues. In his view, theoretical reason is limited and restricted, its perceptions differ greatly from each other, and philosophers also disagree on many issues. Given that the perceptions of reason are general concepts and meanings, reason is not limited or restricted. Theoretical reason, using general premises and meanings, understands many religious knowledge, such as the return of all multiplicity to true unity, and explains demonstrably how multiplicity emerges from the true unit. Having a difference of opinion about a demonstrable subject does not invalidate theoretical reason in its perceptions. Rather, in this case, reason also proves the correctness or incorrectness of a subject by using axioms. In many of the arguments presented by Qunavi, there is confusion and fallacy between the rulings of the faculty of fear (which perceives partial meanings) and the evidence of theoretical reason (which perceives mere generalities).

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