نوع مقاله : علمی پژوهشی
نویسنده
نویسندۀ مسئول، استادیار، عضو هیئت علمی گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشکده علوم پایه و کاربردی، دانشگاه صنعتی کرمانشاه، کرمانشاه، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
Mullā Ṣadrā’s Proof of the Truthful (Burhān al-Ṣiddīqīn) is one of the most influential arguments for the existence of God in Islamic philosophy. It is grounded in the primacy of existence, the gradation of being, and an ontological conception of causality, and thus differs fundamentally from essence-based and classical cosmological arguments. In contrast, Antony Flew, a leading figure in twentieth-century analytical atheism, developed influential critiques of theistic arguments, particularly those based on Aristotelian–Thomistic causality, the argument from design, and empirically oriented models of explanation.
The main question of this study is whether Flew’s critiques, given their epistemological and semantic presuppositions, also apply to the ontological structure of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Proof of the Truthful. Using a conceptual and comparative method, this article examines the metaphysical foundations of Transcendent Philosophy and analytic philosophy of religion in order to assess the scope of Flew’s objections.
The study argues that Flew’s critiques do not extend to the Proof of the Truthful because they presuppose an empirical and essence-based model of causality, whereas Ṣadrā’s argument is based on an analysis of existence qua existence, a graded structure of being, and the existential necessity of the Necessary Being. Consequently, the Proof of the Truthful operates at a different explanatory level and remains largely unaffected by Flew’s objections, while also offering resources for the contemporary reformulation of theistic arguments in philosophy of religion.
کلیدواژهها [English]
)