نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسنده
پژوهشگاه حوزه و دانشگاه، قم، ایران
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسنده [English]
The mind-body dualism is one of the important topics in philosophy of mind, which has many effects on our philosophical and religious knowledge. One of the arguments for Substance dualism is the argument of "personal identity" that Islamic and Western philosophers have addressed. On the other hand, physicalists try to criticize this argument and present a material image of the continuity of the soul throughout life. In this regard, they point to the constancy of brain neurons and the structural or functional unity of the body or brain throughout life, or they consider the space-time continuity of the stretched body as a criterion for this.
The present article first tries to strengthen the empirical basis of this argument by using new findings in molecular biology and neuroscience, and then with the phenomenology of this personal identity and the use of philosophical and analytical foundations (such as the separation between real unity and nominal unity and separation between doubtful "or" and definition "or") tries to respond to physicalist criticisms.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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