نوع مقاله : علمی پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه شاهد تهران
2 نویسندۀ مسئول، دانشگاه شیراز
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
In Islamic philosophy, the question of the soul’s immateriality is one of the most fundamental and complex topics in philosophical anthropology. Ibn Sina, among the foremost Muslim philosophers, presented several arguments to demonstrate the immaterial nature of the rational soul. In contemporary times, some scholars, notably Ayatollah Fayyazi, have critically re-examined these arguments, questioning their premises and validity.
This study, using an analytical approach, investigates the key objections raised by Fayyazi against Ibn Sina’s proofs of immateriality. His critiques include: doubts about the indivisibility of intelligible forms; rejection of the correlation between immateriality and indivisibility; challenges to the self-evidence of perceptual degrees; denial of an ontological distinction between sensory and rational faculties; considering the “suspended man” argument unrealistic; and questioning the individuation of scientific forms. He also denies the necessary connection between immateriality and unity on one side, and materiality and multiplicity on the other.
The findings indicate that most critiques suffer from logical and epistemological flaws and do not undermine Ibn Sina’s proofs. The study concludes that, despite contemporary objections, classical arguments regarding the immateriality of the soul remain coherent, logically sound, and persuasive.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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